Zambrano Settled Status EU settlement scheme Paper Application Form - NEW

[marcidevpal]

A witness statement is about YOU

A skeleton argument is about the LAW

[marcidevpal]

ATTENTION!

Don't just copy and paste the skeleton argument and witness statement. Just use it as an example. Make your own document. Choose your own arguments. There are plenty of points over these pages, or you can talk to a charity or a solicitor.

The previous examples are NOT legal advice. Thanks and best of luck

[Nyamebeye]

Where did I sleep?
Well..., I applied for a replacement BRC to reflect my settled status from the pre-settled I held. I got it in 2 days . I did biometric on Friday 4th. Got it on Sun 6th. Unbelievable . Didn't know they work on Sundays now. I thought I was dreaming. I was prepared to wait like 6months esp as my pre settled was no where near expiration.

[Eburnie27]

Where did I sleep?
Well..., I applied for a replacement BRC to reflect my settled status from the pre-settled I held. I got it in 2 days . I did biometric on Friday 4th. Got it on Sun 6th. Unbelievable . Didn't know they work on Sundays now. I thought I was dreaming. I was prepared to wait like 6months esp as my pre settled was no where near expiration.

God works in mysterious ways. I am really happy for you

[mubashir1981]

Where did I sleep?
Well..., I applied for a replacement BRC to reflect my settled status from the pre-settled I held. I got it in 2 days . I did biometric on Friday 4th. Got it on Sun 6th. Unbelievable . Didn't know they work on Sundays now. I thought I was dreaming. I was prepared to wait like 6months esp as my pre settled was no where near expiration.

Brp department is the only efficient in HO.

[mubashir1981]

Where did I sleep?
Well..., I applied for a replacement BRC to reflect my settled status from the pre-settled I held. I got it in 2 days . I did biometric on Friday 4th. Got it on Sun 6th. Unbelievable . Didn't know they work on Sundays now. I thought I was dreaming. I was prepared to wait like 6months esp as my pre settled was no where near expiration.

Brp department is the only efficient in HO.

[Mypapers]

Hi
I still have two pending cases with Home Office
The Zambrano application
2 1/2 years Visa 10 year route
Now i am three months pregnant with my second child. Do I need to inform Home Office about this and will it make any difference in my applications outcome
thank you

[Nyamebeye]

Hi
I still have two pending cases with Home Office
The Zambrano application
2 1/2 years Visa 10 year route
Now i am three months pregnant with my second child. Do I need to inform Home Office about this and will it make any difference in my applications outcome
thank you

No, unless not having a decision on both applications is impacting on you( work, emergency travel, access to Healthcare) etc. Being pregnant alone would not add any weight to both applications.

[marcidevpal]

If you are making an appeal based on your human rights, you may want to know

Based on a recent article,

On October 17, UK Justice Secretary Dominic Raab announced his intention to overhaul the Human Rights Act.

Raab said he wanted to "stop Strasbourg dictating to us" and promised to find a way to allow the government to "correct" the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

The UK’s 1998 Human Rights Act requires the UK courts to take into account the laws set out in the European Convention on Human Rights, which was signed by the UK in 1949.

Like all signatories, the UK is bound to recognise the authority of the ECHR, which was established in 1959. The government simply does not have the authority to declare that any ECHR ruling is wrong.

But if he or anyone else wants to reject the authority of the ECHR and its judges, it would mean not just repealing the Human Rights Act, but also leaving the convention.

It is not for any signatory government, however properly elected, to decide that any of the court’s judgments is or is not correct.

[marcidevpal]

IN THE FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL

Appeal No. 123456789

BETWEEN:

MRS ALIYA JOHNSON
Claimant/Respondent

and


SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Defendant/Applicant

___________________________________________

Skeleton Argument on behalf of the Claimant
___________________________________________

1. This is the Claimant’s skeleton argument.

KEY READING

2. The Court is likely to require 60 minutes of reading. The key documents are listed below:

a. Application dated 25 January 2020
b. Refusal letter dated 14 July 2022
c. Witness Statement of Mrs Aliya Johnson dated 13 November 2022 (“WS/AJ”)
d. Notice of Decision dated 10 July 2022

PRELIMINARIES

3. The Defendant has a pending judicial review before the Upper Tribunal in Akinsaya v SSHD.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4. In the refusal letter, on page 2, paragraph 5, the respondent states,

Reasons why your application has been refused

1. you must meet the requirements of that definition throughout the continuous qualifying period in the UK in which you rely on being or having been 'a person with a Zambrano right to reside.' Broadly, the requirements are that the person meets the relevant conditions of regulation 16 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations and does not hold leave to remain (unless this was granted under the EU Settlement Scheme); and

2. that continuous qualifying period in the UK as a 'person with a Zambrano right to reside' must have begun before the specified date (2300 GMT on 31 December 2020), unless you fall within sub-paragraph (b) or (c) of the definition of a 'relevant EEA family permit case' in Annex 1 to Appendix EU; and

3. you must meet one of the following: either:

(a) your continuous qualifying period in the UK as a 'person with a Zambrano right to reside' must be continuing at the date of your application to the scheme; or

(b) your continuous qualifying period in the UK as a 'person with a Zambrano right to reside' must have been continuing at the specified date and ended when you completed a five-year continuous qualifying period in the UK as such a person (and by the date of your application to the scheme there has been no supervening event); or

(c) at the date of your application to the scheme, you must be a 'person who had a derivative or Zambrano right to reside' immediately before you met another qualifying category (such as the family member of a relevant EEA citizen) and have since remained in that or another qualifying category through to the date of your application to the scheme.

Your application has been refused because you do not satisfy paragraphs [1, 2 and/or 3] above.

The respondent further writes,

"Your continuous qualifying period in the UK as a 'person with a Zambrano right to reside' was not continuing at the specified date or at the date of your application to the EU Settlement Scheme, as you held leave to remain under another part of the Immigration Rules a those dates. You therefore do not meet the requirements of (a) or (b) in paragraph 3, above."

and also,

"At the date of your application you were not a 'person who had a derivative or Zambrano right to reside' (as defined in Annex 1 to Appendix EU), as you were not 'a person with a Zambrano right to reside' immediately before meeting another qualifying category under sub-paragraph (a) of condition 3 in the rule EU11 and remaining in that or another such category through to the date of application."

5. The respondent is wrong to reach this decision

Paragraph 1

A person with a Zambrano right to reside is a person who holds leave to remain under another part of the Immigration Rules, so long as the leave to remain was granted after the person became a Zambrano carer.

Paragraph 2

Ms Johnson's status as a person with a Zambrano right to reside is evidenced by the child's birth certificate, council tax receipts, etc.

Paragraph 3

(a) Under the EEA Regulations, Ms Johnson became a person with a Zambrano carer in January 2015. By December 2020, Ms Johnson was still a Zambrano carer, or

(b) Under the EEA Regulations, Ms Johnson became a person with a Zambrano carer in January 2015. By December 2020, Ms Johnson had completed the required five years as a Zambrano carer, or

(c) Ms Johnson was a Zambrano carer, as defined by the EEA Regulations in January 2015 immediately before she became the family member of an EEA citizen in January 2018.

UK CASE LAW

6. In Supreme Court Decision, MM and others v SSHD
insert reference
discussion

7. In Upper Tribunal Decision, SSHD v Zarmir, UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH explains

I have carefully considered the Court of Appeal's judgment in Akinsanya. In that case, the appellant was a person who had already been granted limited leave to remain in the UK. The Respondent's argument was that, as a person with a domestic law right to remain in the UK, a right to reside could not arise as there would be no need for that person to leave and therefore no compulsion on the EEA national to leave with that person. The appellant's argument was that the right existed independently of whether a person had a domestic law right to remain.

The Court resolved that issue in the Respondent's favour (see [54] and [55] of the judgment). However, crucially, the Court went on when dealing with the second ground in that appeal, to find that regulation 16 of the EEA Regulations could still be met if a person had only limited leave to remain. As Mr Thompson pointed out, the appellant in Akinsanya won her appeal notwithstanding that she already had limited leave to remain.
I also agree with Mr Thompson, however, that Akinsanya is not directly on point in this appeal since at the time of the Decision, the Appellant did not have any leave to remain. It is only as a result of the allowing of the appeal also on Article 8 grounds (and subsequent grant of leave whether consequent on the outcome of the appeal or further application) that the Appellant has been granted leave to remain. That cannot therefore disclose any error of law on the part of this Judge. It is for that reason that I rejected the Respondent's request for an adjournment.

As Mr Thompson pointed out, the Judge applied the correct test to whether the Appellant met the EEA Regulations (see [13] and [14] of the Decision). Contrary to what is said in the grant of permission, the Judge was right to focus on regulation 16 of the EEA Regulations. The Judge clearly understood that the Respondent's decision under appeal was in response to an application under the EU settlement scheme (see [2] of the Decision). However, crucially the question to be answered in that regard, as the Respondent's decision under appeal made clear, was whether the Appellant had a right to reside under regulation 16 of the EEA Regulations. The Judge was therefore right to decide that issue as she did at [13] and [14] of the Decision.

For those reasons, I conclude that the Judge did not err in law. She determined the issues under both EU law and domestic law, applying the correct tests. Although the Appellant, following the Decision (if it were not appealed and now due to the grant of leave) was entitled to limited leave to remain, she did not have leave to remain at that time. Crucially, even if she did, that leave would not have been sufficient to preclude her relying on her Zambrano rights as such leave would have been limited. Based on the Court of Appeal's judgment in Akinsanya, she could therefore still enjoy a Zambrano right to reside, independently of her grant of limited leave. The Judge did not therefore err in her conclusion that the Appellant had a right to reside under regulation 16 of the EEA Regulations and by allowing the appeal also on this basis.

discuss


EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

8. Under Article 8 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights,

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Next, make your point about how this article relates to you

UNITED NATIONS

9. Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 16 December 1966)
insert reference from the convenant
add your point



EU DIRECTIVES

10. Although the UK is no longer part of the EU, the logic of Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) is relevant
insert reference
discuss why relevant

11. Directive 2003/109/EC (the Long-term Residents Directive, or LTRD) is also instructive
insert reference
explain why

EU CASE LAW

12. In E.K. versus the Netherlands,
insert reference
discuss the importance of this case

CONCLUSION
13. The Court is invited to (I can't remember the correct words here) and award the Claimant's costs.

Aliyah Johnson
13 November 2022
[/quote]

[marcidevpal]

Notes on a recent Tribunal decision - Williams versus SSHD

https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov. ... 06890-2021

In this case, the mother applied for settlement when her daughter was 17 years old. She did not have leave to remain under Appendix FM.

The Home Office refused her application. They said she was not a Zambrano carer because the daughter would not leave the UK if the mother left the UK.

The Judge agreed that = she was not a Zambrano carer but could remain in the UK anyway due to her close ties with her daughter.

[marcidevpal]

Anonymous vs SSHD

https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov. ... 00386-2021

In September 2020, he was refused a derivative residence card. In November 2020, he was refused settlement under the EU scheme.

The Home Office accepted that he was the primary caregiver for his British citizen child but that as he was not the sole carer, the child would not be compelled to leave the UK if he was required to leave and return to his country of origin, Jamaica, indefinitely.

20. However, the question for the FtT was whether his son would be compelled to leave. Given the specific factual circumstances of this case, the FtT concluded that the British citizen child would not be compelled to leave. In the circumstances, the FtT concluded that the appellant was not a Zambrano carer and that was a finding that was open to the FtT to make. There was no error of law.

8. At the outset, notwithstanding that the appellant is a litigant in person, I pay tribute to the quality of his oral submissions. His submissions were clear, relevant and engaged with complex legal issues. On attending the Tribunal, I provided to him copies of the Shah v Patel decision, as well as copies of the cases of SSHD v RM (Pakistan) [2021] EWCA Civ 1754; Velaj v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 767 and Akinsanya v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 37. In view of the fact that the appellant was a litigant in person, Ms Cunha agreed that she would make the respondent’s submissions first, to which the appellant would have the opportunity to respond.

[Nyamebeye]

Notes on a recent Tribunal decision - Williams versus SSHD

https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov. ... 06890-2021

In this case, the mother applied for settlement when her daughter was 17 years old. She did not have leave to remain under Appendix FM.

The Home Office refused her application. They said she was not a Zambrano carer because the daughter would not leave the UK if the mother left the UK.

The Judge agreed that = she was not a Zambrano carer but could remain in the UK anyway due to her close ties with her daughter.

Thanks for sharing this. It was a grandmother and a granddaughter not mother and daughter. It was an interesting case to read.

[Mypapers]

Is it just me noticing. All the Zambrano application decisions have gone quiet. I’m still waiting for mine. No decision been made.

[marcidevpal]

Cases that are similar to Akinsaya's should really be decided after Akinsaya's next hearing.

[marcidevpal]

The appellant is a citizen of Ghana was born on 21 October 1989. He arrived in the UK with valid entry clearance as a student in January 2020, valid until 7 January 2021. On 30 November 2020, he applied for leave to remain under paragraph EU14 of Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules, on the basis that he was dependent upon his brother-in-law, Emmanuel Frimpong, a Belgian citizen who is married to the appellant’s sister. I shall refer to Mr Frimpong as “the sponsor”.

See - https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov. ... 09930-2021

For the Home Office - Appellant: Mr T. Melvin, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

For the Respondent: Mr F. Khan, Counsel, instructed by Kenton Solicitors

23. Since Mr Melvin declined to consent to the tribunal considering Article 8 ECHR issues, it follows that the only option open to me was to dismiss the appeal. The appellant has not been issued with a “relevant document”, meaning he is incapable of being a “family member of a relevant EEA citizen”, and so fails to meet the eligibility criteria under paragraph EU14.

Notice of Decision
The decision of Judge Joshi involved the making of an error of law.
I set the decision aside and remake the decision, dismissing the appeal.
The remade appeal is dismissed under the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.
No anonymity direction is made.
I make no fee award.

[marcidevpal]

1. The appellant is a citizen of Cameroon born on 25th March 1988 and she appealed against the decision of the Secretary of State dated 14th January 2021 refusing her a derivative residence card as the primary carer of a British citizen child under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016.

2. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on a Tier 4 visa valid from 7th September 2009 until 31st December 2010 and subsequently sought leave to remain as a student which was granted and subsequently extended until 31st May 2013.

On 1st July 2013 she sought leave to remain on the basis of her family and private life but that was refused on 22nd July 2013. Subsequent applications on 3rd February 2014 on Article 8 grounds and on 12th May 2016 and on 19th May 2016 were refused.

On 7th September 2017 the appellant claimed asylum and that too was refused but she was granted leave apparently on a discretionary basis to remain until 14th July 2022. Work was permitted according to her residence permit.

See - https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov. ... 01503-2021

Representation:

For the Appellant: Miss Latale in person
For the Respondent: Mr P Deller, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Notice of decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
No anonymity direction is made.

Signed Helen Rimington Date 27th September 2022

Upper Tribunal Judge Rimington

[marcidevpal]

Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2000)15

The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Europe

https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_ ... 16804eb800

a. Each member state should recognise as a"long-term immigrant" an alien who:

i. has resided lawfully and habitually for a period of at least five years and for a maximum of ten years on its territory otherwise than exclusively as a student throughout that period; or

ii. has been authorised to reside on its territory permanently or for a period of at least five years; or

iii. is a family member whose residence on the territory of the member state has been authorised for a maximum period of five years for the purpose of family reunification with a national of the member state or an alien as defined in sub- paragraphs i and ii above

[marcidevpal]

CELIK and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights

Arguing human rights grounds of appeal in EUSS cases

In Celik (EU exit; marriage; human rights) [2022] UKUT 00220 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal confirmed that regulation 9(4) confers a power on the First-tier Tribunal to consider a human rights ground.

The power is subject to the prohibition of regulation 9(5) upon the Tribunal considering a new matter without the consent of the Respondent.

The Respondent's consent must be sought.

[marcidevpal]

CELIK

See - https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov. ... ukut-00220

70. The powers of the First-tier Tribunal are set by regulations 8 and 9 of the 2020 Regulations.

We shall address regulation 9 under the heading relating to Article 8 of the ECHR.

Regulation 8 states that an appeal must be brought on one or both of two grounds.

The first is that the decision breaches any right which the appellant has by virtue of (here) Title II of Part 2 of the Withdrawal Agreement.

As we have seen, that includes Article 18.

For the reasons we have given, the appellant has no substantive rights under that Article.

The 2020 Regulations

Immigration (Citizens’ Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”)

See - https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/202 ... ion/9/made

Matters to be considered by the relevant authority

9.—(1) If an appellant makes a section 120 statement, the relevant authority must consider any matter raised in that statement which constitutes a specified ground of appeal against the decision appealed against.

For the purposes of this paragraph, a “specified ground of appeal” is a ground of appeal of a kind listed in regulation 8 or section 84 of the 2002 Act(1).

(2) In this regulation, “section 120 statement” means a statement made under section 120 of the 2002 Act(2) and includes any statement made under that section, as applied by Schedule 1 or 2 to these Regulations.

(3) For the purposes of this regulation, it does not matter whether a section 120 statement is made before or after the appeal under these Regulations is commenced.

(4) The relevant authority may also consider any matter which it thinks relevant to the substance of the decision appealed against, including a matter arising after the date of the decision.

(5) But the relevant authority must not consider a new matter without the consent of the Secretary of State.

(6) A matter is a “new matter” if—

(a)it constitutes a ground of appeal of a kind listed in regulation 8 or section 84 of the 2002 Act, and

(b)the Secretary of State has not previously considered the matter in the context of—

(i)the decision appealed against under these Regulations, or

(ii)a section 120 statement made by the appellant.

[marcidevpal]

Section 120 Statement

See - https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/20 ... ection/120

120 Requirement to state additional grounds for application

(1)Subsection (2) applies to a person (“P”) if—

(a)P has made a protection claim or a human rights claim,

(b)P has made an application to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, or

(c)a decision to deport or remove P has been or may be taken.

(2)The Secretary of State or an immigration officer may serve a notice on P requiring P to provide a statement setting out—

(a)P's reasons for wishing to enter or remain in the United Kingdom,

(b)any grounds on which P should be permitted to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, and

(c)any grounds on which P should not be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom.

(3)A statement under subsection (2) need not repeat reasons or grounds set out in—

(a)P's protection or human rights claim,

(b)the application mentioned in subsection (1)(b), or

(c)an application to which the decision mentioned in subsection (1)(c) relates.

(4)Subsection (5) applies to a person (“P”) if P has previously been served with a notice under subsection (2) and—

(a)P requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom but does not have it, or

(b)P has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom only by virtue of section 3C F2... of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending decision or appeal).

(5)Where P's circumstances have changed since the Secretary of State or an immigration officer was last made aware of them (whether in the application or claim mentioned in subsection (1) or in a statement under subsection (2) or this subsection) so that P has—

(a)additional reasons for wishing to enter or remain in the United Kingdom,

(b)additional grounds on which P should be permitted to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, or

(c)additional grounds on which P should not be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom,

P must, as soon as reasonably practicable, provide a supplementary statement to the Secretary of State or an immigration officer setting out the new circumstances and the additional reasons or grounds.

(6)In this section—

“human rights claim” and “protection claim” have the same meanings as in Part 5;

references to “grounds” are to grounds on which an appeal under Part 5 may be brought (see section 84).]

[marcidevpal]

More on Article 8 ECHR,

Before your hearing, it seems you can make a (section 120) statement to explain why you feel your refusal reduces your rights under Article 8 of the ECHR.

If you wait to raise Article 8 and you try to raise it during the hearing, you have to ask the Home Office for permission to raise Article 8 ECHR.

It seems the Home Office will be less likely to allow the judge to consider your Article 8 Human Rights.

[marcidevpal]

More on Article 8 and EUSS

Some may argue you can not raise an Article 8 claim when you appeal your settlement scheme refusal - unless you first get the permission of the Home Office.

This argument is blatantly false, in my opinion. These rights are fundamental.

The UK cannot make regulations that sit outside of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Everything the UK does can be judged from an ECHR perspective, because they are members of the Council of Europe.

Every refusal can be judged according to its adherence to Article 8 ECHR, in my opinion.

See - https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf

Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared;

Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention,
Have agreed as follows:

Here is an excerpt regarding Article 8:

https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf

Updated on 31 August 2022

Article 8 encompasses the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. In general, the Court has defined the scope of Article 8 broadly, even when a specific right is not set out in the Article.

While Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and ensure due respect for the interests safeguarded by Article 8 (Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], § 147).

Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private life (Lozovyye v. Russia, § 36)

Where the case concerns a negative obligation, the Court must assess whether the interference was consistent with the requirements of Article 8 paragraph 2, namely in accordance with the law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and necessary in a democratic society.

As in the case of negative obligations, in implementing their positive obligations under Article 8, the States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be restricted (for example, X and Y v. the Netherlands, §§ 24 and 27; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], §90; Pretty v.the United Kingdom, §71).

According to well-established case-law, “in all decisions concerning children their best interests are of paramount importance. (...) It follows that there is an obligation on States to place the best interests of the child, and also those of children as a group, at the centre of all decisions affecting their health and development” (Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], §§ 287-288; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], § 135 and, X v. Latvia [GC], § 96).

Article 8 requires that the domestic authorities strike a fair balance between the interests of the child and those of the parents and that, in the balancing process, particular importance should be attached to the best interests of the child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the parents (see the recapitulation of the general principles in Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], § 145).

The mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention (even if the relationship between the parents has broken down), and domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right protected by Article 8 of the Convention (Monory v. Romania and Hungary, § 70; Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, § 68; Kutzner v. Germany, § 58; Elsholz v. Germany [GC], § 43; K. and T. v. Finland [GC], § 151).

[marcidevpal]

To say the point again in simple language:

1.) You filed an application under the EU Settlement Scheme. You were refused.

2.) A judge may say you have no right to raise human rights issues because the EU Settlement Scheme does not allow applicants to raise human rights concerns.

3.) The judge goes on to say further, the only way you can raise a human rights issue, is if the Home Office say you can raise a human rights claim.

Without having a law degree, you should know something is up. That is not how human rights are supposed to work.

It makes no sense to ask the organisation that is responsible for denying you your rights, for permission to fight for those rights.

If a Zambrano carer is refused permission to argue on human rights grounds, that carer should appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, in my opinion.

[marcidevpal]

SSHD v Singh

https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov. ... 12004-2021

42. Furthermore, the two schemes arise in an entirely different context. In particular, as the Tribunal has pointed out in both Celik and Batool, “it is not possible to invoke principles of EU law in interpreting the Withdrawal Agreement, save insofar as that Agreement specifically provides”.

44. Doubtless, the Respondent can always exercise discretion to consider an application made on one basis on a different basis or even to consider an individual case without any formal application. The issue is whether there is any requirement for her to do so.

The only basis on which this Tribunal can allow an appeal against a decision refusing status under the EUSS is

• that the decision breaches a right under the Withdrawal Agreement or

• is not in accordance with the Immigration Rules (here Appendix EU).

An argument that the Respondent should have exercised discretion in domestic law and that not to do was unfair does not fall within either the Withdrawal Agreement or Appendix EU.

Put another way, the Appellant had and has no rights under either the Withdrawal Agreement or Appendix EU to have his application made on one basis considered on a different basis.

That is the effect of the guidance given in Batool which we consider applies equally to this appeal.